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Abstract
This experimental study investigates the effect of signal strength on the formation of
informational cascades by introducing heterogeneous signal qualities associated with the
fixed order of decisions on the two different decision−making systems, anti−seniority and
seniority. Major findings include that complete cascades occur more frequently in seniority
than in anti−seniority, that seniority is more efficient than anti−seniority, but increases the
risk of creating negative cascades, and that private signals can be extracted more effectively
in anti−seniority than in seniority. For both treatments, rational complete cascades occur less
frequently than those suggested by the Bayesian model. For the heuristic subjects employed,
the anchoring effect of private signals is partially identified.
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Informational cascades are said to occur if players ignore private signals by
followingan establishedpattern of actions thattheir predecessors have chosen
as a result of Bayesian updating in a sequential decision-making problem.
Anderson, L. R. and C. A. Holt (1997) con…rmed that informational cascades
certainly occur in the laboratory as Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and
I. Welch (1992) suggests. However, other experimental studies including
Çelen, B. and S. Kariv (2004), Nöth, M. and M. Weber (2003), Kraemer,
C., M. Nöth, and M. Weber (2000), and Huck, S. and J. Oechssler (2000)
generally argue that subjects put more weight on their private signals than
the Bayesian model assumes.
This experimental study investigates the e¤ect of signal strength on the
formationofinformational cascades by introducingheterogeneoussignal qual-
ities associated with the …xed order of decisions on the two di¤erent decision-
making systems, anti-seniority and seniority. Major …ndings include that
complete cascades occur more frequently in seniority than in anti-seniority,
that seniority is more e¢cient than anti-seniority, but increases the risk of
creating negative cascades, and that private signals can be extracted more
e¤ectively in anti-seniority than in seniority. For both treatments, rational
complete cascades occur less frequently than those suggested by the Bayesian
model. For the heuristic subjects use, the anchoring e¤ect of private signals
is identi…ed in deviations by overcon…dence, but is not identi…ed clearly in
deviations by undercon…dence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the analytical framework and presents some theoretical predictions. Section
3 describes experimental procedure, and section 4 reports and discusses the
results.
2 Analytical Framework
There are two states of the world ! 2 fA;Bg: Each state is realized equally
likely, Pr(A) = Pr(B) = 1=2: In the experiment, each of six subjects i 2
f1;2;:::;6g does not observe the realized state, but receives a private signal
¾i
! for the underlying state !: The quality of private signal Pr(Aj¾i
A) or
Pr(Bj¾i
B) is drawn from the six levels of precision f:55;:6;:65;:7;:75;:8g and
is exogenously determined by the position to which a subject is assigned. In
addition to private signals, subjects later assigned to position 2 can observe
their predecessors’ predictions. After observing the private signal and the
predecessors’ predictions, each subject makes a prediction ¼i
! of which states
1would be realized one-by-one in sequence.
In the experiment, two treatments anti-seniority1 and seniority are con-
ducted. The di¤erence in each treatment lies in the combination of sig-
nal qualities and order in which predictions are made, as summarized in
Table 1. In anti-seniority, six subjects make predictions in ascending or-
der of the signal qualities. That is, the subject who has the least precise
signal makes the prediction in position 1 (Pr(Aj¾1
A) = Pr(Bj¾1
B) =.55),
the subject who has the second least precise signal makes the prediction
in position 2 (Pr(Aj¾2
A) = Pr(Bj¾2
B) =.6), and in like manner, the sub-
ject who has the most precise signal makes the prediction in position 6
(Pr(Aj¾6
A) = Pr(Bj¾6
B) =.8). In seniority, six subjects make predictions in
descending order of thesignal qualities. That is, the subjectwho has themost
precise signal makes the prediction in position 1(Pr(Aj¾1
A) = Pr(Bj¾1
B) =.8),
the subject who has the second most precise signal makes the prediction
in position 2 (Pr(Aj¾2
A) = Pr(Bj¾2
B) =.75), and in like manner, the sub-




In the experiment, the combination of signal qualities and order of de-
cisions are common knowledge among all subjects. Thus, if subjects act
as rational Bayesians, these two di¤erent treatments would create di¤erent
behavioral patterns in the aggregate as follows.
In anti-seniority, complete informational cascades2 occur ifsubjects in the
…rst three consecutive positions make the same predictions. For example, the
posterior probability that state Awouldberealizedgiven that the subjects in
the …rst three consecutive positions have predicted A andthe subject in posi-










:593. In this case, the subject in position 4 should ignore his or her private
signal by following the established pattern of predictions. Once he or she
enters a cascade, the subjects in positions 5 and 6 should ignore their own
private signals of ¾B as well. In seniority, the subject in position 2 should
make the same predictions as the …rst subject, even when the private sig-









2£[(:8£:25)+(:2£:75)] = :571: This
leads to the result that subjects in a round should always make unanimous
predictions regardless of whether they enter informational cascades or they
truthfully reveal their own private signals.
1The term anti-seniority is used in Ottaviani, M. and P. N. Sørensen (2001).
2For the de…nition of complete informational cascades, see section 4.1.
23 Experimental Procedure
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate students at Keio University. Be-
fore the experiment began they were instructed about the entire structure
of the experiment3. At the beginning of each round, the experimenter an-
nounced which treatment was to be conducted in order to make the combi-
nation of signal quality and the order of decision common knowledge. The
experimenter drew one of the two cards from a box. On the card a letter,
either ”A” or ”B” was printed and the letter on the card drawn represented
the state of the world for that round. After con…rming the letter, the exper-
imenter then hid it from the subjects until the round was completed. Each
subject then drew one of the six cards for determining the combination of
the signal quality and the order of the decision.
Private signals were implemented by having the subjects draw one of
20 white or red marbles from a box. The white marbles represented state
A and the red marbles represented state B. Di¤erent signal qualities were
created by varying the proportionof white and red marbles in abox given the
realizedstate, treatment, andtheassigned signal quality foreach subject. For
example, if state A had been realized, a subject who was assigned to position
1 in the anti-seniority treatment drew a marble from the box containing 11
white and nine red marbles4.
The experimenter approached each subject in turn and presented the box
containing the exact proportion of white and red marbles for each subject
from the set of six5. The subject drew a marble from the box and wrote
down the state indicated by the color on the subject’s record sheet. Then,
the subject made a prediction by writing down one of the two states he or
she thought which was more likely to be on the subject’s record sheet. The
experimenter wrote down the subject’s signal and prediction on the experi-
menter’s record sheet. The experimenter then approached the subject in the
next position and showedthe sequence ofhis or her predecessors’ predictions.
After all six subjects submitted predictions, the card the experimenter had
drawnat the beginning of the roundwas revealed. This process was repeated
16 times in one session with combinations of each treatment6.
3Subject instructions are available upon request to the author.
4The various combinations of the marbles in each position and the state for each treat-
ment are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
5A set of six identical boxes, upon which codes were marked, was stored in a larger
box separately from the states and kept in another room. After con…rming the state,
the experimenter brought the appropriate set from that room so that subjects could not
identify which set was actually used. By checking the codes on the box, the experimenter
could choose the appropriate box for each subject.
6The actual order of treatment in each session is shown in Table 4.
3Sixty-six subjects participated in the experiment. After the session, sub-
jects were privately paid their payo¤s in cash. For each correct prediction,
200 Japanese yen (equivalent to $1.84) was paid. The average, minimum,
and maximum payment was 2309 yen, 800 yen and 3200 yen, respectively.
4 Results
4.1 Aggregated Behavior
In order to compare the aggregated behavior of each treatment, the analysis
is based on the following three criteria: complete positive (negative) cascades,
partial cascades, and full revelations.
A complete positive (negative) cascade denotes a pattern of behavior such
that at least one subject ignores his or her private signal by following the
established pattern of predictions, and all of the six subjects in a round make
unanimous correct (incorrect) predictions. Among complete positive (nega-
tive) cascades, a pattern of behavior such that all predictions are consistent
withBayesianposteriorprobability is called a rational complete positive (neg-
ative) cascade. A partial cascade denotes a pattern of behavior such that at
least one subject ignores his or her private signal by following the established
pattern of predictions, but at least one subject collapses it. As a result, pre-
dictions are not unanimous in a round. A full revelation denotes a pattern
of behaviors such that all of the subjects make predictions consistent with
their private signals. An aggregated behavior is counted as a full revelation
regardless of whether predictions are consistent with Bayesian posteriors, or
whether they are unanimous. Note that these three criteria do not overlap
each other.
Result 1: Learning within each session was not observed.
Tables 5 and 6 report the Mann–Whitney U-tests on an equal proportion
of predictions which is consistent with the Bayesian posterior between the
…rst and the last two rounds within each session for each treatment. In both
treatments, the null hypothesis of no di¤erence cannot be rejected for all
sessions7. Therefore, any systematic pattern of learning within each session
was not observed, so that we can pool the data for each treatment and
compare their properties.
7In seniority, almost all predictions in the …rst and the last two rounds within each
session are identically consistent with Bayesian posterior, such that the Mann–Whitney
U-test cannot be performed for those sessions. In sessions 6 and 11 where di¤erent propor-
tions of Bayesian consistent predictions were observed, they are not signi…cantly di¤erent
between the …rst and last two rounds.
4Result 2: Subjects made more correct predictions in seniority than in
anti-seniority.
The proportion of correct predictions in anti-seniority is 69.49%, whereas
that in seniority is 81.94% (Table 7, row 1). The Mann–Whitney U-test
shows that this di¤erence is statistically signi…cant (Table 8, row 1). We can
then say that seniority increases subjects’ welfare in the sense that it leads
to more correct predictions.
Result 3: Complete (positive and negative) cascades and rational complete
(positive and negative) cascades occurred more frequently in seniority than
in anti-seniority, whereas partial cascades occurred more frequently in anti-
seniority than in seniority.
The observed proportions of complete (positive and negative) cascades
andrational complete (positive and negative) cascades are higher in seniority
than in anti-seniority (Table 7, row 2- row 5). The Mann-Whitney U-test
shows that all of these di¤erences are statistically signi…cant (Table 8, row
2-row 5). However, the observed proportion of partial cascades is higher
in anti-seniority than in seniority (Table 7, row 6), which is signi…cantly
di¤erent (Table 8, row 6). Therefore, seniority enhances the occurrence of
positivecascades, but alsoincreases the risk of negative cascades. Meanwhile,
the established cascades are more likely to be collapsed in anti-seniority than
in seniority.
Result 4: Full revelations occurred more frequently in anti-seniority than
in seniority.
The proportion of full revelations in anti-seniority is 58.04% whereas that
in seniority is 20.00% (Table 7, row 7), which is signi…cantly di¤erent (Table
8, row 7). Thus, anti-seniority extracts private signals more e¤ectively than
in seniority.
Result 5: For both treatments, rational complete (positive and negative)
cascades occurred less frequently than the Bayesian model would suggest.
The probability that rational complete cascades occur is given by the
probability that unanimous predictions by full revelations occur, subtracted
from the probability that complete cascades occur since unanimous predic-
tions by full revelations are not counted in rational complete cascades. In











A)] = :125: Rational complete negative cas-










B)] = :062: In senior-


















However, observed proportions of rational complete cascades are consis-
tently lower than the probabilities calculated above (Table 7, rows 4 and
5). The one-tailed tests of population proportion show that for both treat-
ments, the observed proportions of rational complete (positive and negative)
cascades are signi…cantly lower than those suggested by the Bayesian model
(Tables 9 and 10).
4.2 Analysis of Deviation
Given these observations, we investigate why some subjects do not act as the
Bayesian theory predicts. To do so, we focus on two types of deviation, over-
con…dence and undercon…dence. In the current experiment, overcon…dence
can be de…ned as a prediction that is not consistent with Bayesian posterior,
but is consistent with the subject’s private signal. Undercon…dence can be
de…ned as a prediction that is consistent with neither Bayesian posterior, nor
the subject’s private signal, but is consistent with a prediction that is made
by at least one of his or her predecessors8.
As Tables 11–12 show, overcon…dence and undercon…dence certainly ex-
ist9. Given the existence of them, one may think that each subjects’ pre-
dictions are "anchored" by their own signal qualities. That is, subjects with
more precise signals tend to be overcon…dent and subjects with less precise
signals tend to be undercon…dent.
In anti-seniority, the anchoring hypothesis postulates that deviations by
undercon…dence would occur more in earlier positions and less in later posi-
tions. On the other hand, deviations by overcon…dence would occur more in
later positions and less in earlier positions. Observed deviations by under-
con…dence (Table 11, third column) certainly decrease from 9.82% in position
3 to 1.78% in position 5. However, there are two increases from 4.47% in
position 2 to 9.82% in position 3 and from 1.78% position 5 to 2.68% position
6. This latter observation is not consistent with the systematic pattern of
8The other pattern of deviation can be called irrational because it is consistent with
neither Bayesian posterior, the subject’s private signal, nor any predecessor’s predictions.
19 irrational predictions were observed only in anti-seniority (among 672 decisions). Note
that these three patterns of deviation do not overlap each other.
9In anti-seniority, overcon…dence cannot occur in positions 2 and 3 because obeying
private signals is always consistent with the Bayesian posteriors. In seniority, undercon…-
dence cannot occur in position 2 because obeying the prediction of the subject in position
1 is always consistent with the Bayesian posterior.
6deviations discussed, so that we conclude that the observed deviations by un-
dercon…dence do not perfectly support the anchoring hypothesis. Observed
deviations by overcon…dence (Table 11, second column) increase consistently
from 5.36% in position 4 to 12.50% in position 6. This systematic pattern of
deviations supports the anchoring hypothesis.
In seniority, the anchoring hypothesis postulates that deviations by un-
dercon…dence would occur more in later positions andless inearlierpositions.
On the other hand, deviations by overcon…dence would occur more in earlier
positions and less in later positions. Observed deviations by overcon…dence
decrease from 15.0% in position 2 to about 0% in position 2 later (Table
12, second column). This moderately supports the anchoring hypothesis for
overcon…dence. However, the few observations of deviations for undercon…-
dence (Table 12, third column) do not support it for undercon…dence. To
summarize, we have the following.
Result 6: The anchoring e¤ect is identi…ed in deviations by overcon…-
dence, but is not identi…ed clearly in deviations by undercon…dence.
The unidenti…cation problem of the anchoring e¤ect in deviations by un-
dercon…dence in seniority could be attributed to the intrinsic structure of
posteriors. Subjects in later positions frequently face extreme high or low
posteriors, such that they can make relatively easy predictions consistent
with Bayesian posteriors by following the established pattern of predictions,
even when their private signals do not correspond to it. The unclear iden-
ti…cation problem of the anchoring e¤ect in deviations by undercon…dence
in anti-seniority could be related to the number of available private signals.
The results of experiments by Çelen and Kariv (2004) indicate that subjects
inearlier positions are more likely to be overcon…dent on private signals than
subjects in later positions. If this tendency exists in the current experiment,
undercon…dence in earlier positions could be o¤set by this overcon…dence
and therefore result in the unclear identi…cation of the anchoring e¤ect in
anti-seniority. In order to distinguish between overcon…dence in earlier posi-
tions and the anchoring e¤ect, we need to investigate how these two e¤ects
interact under various conditions.
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8Appendix
Table 1: Combination of signal qualities and order of decisions
in each treatment
Position
1 2 3 4 5 6
Treatment Anti-seniority .55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8
Seniority .8 .75 .7 .65 .6 .55
Table 2: Contents of boxes in each state and each position: Anti-seniority
Anti-seniority
Position (signal quality)
Realized Marbles 1 (.55) 2 (.6) 3 (.65) 4 (.7) 5 (.75) 6 (.8)
state
A White 11 12 13 14 15 16
Red 9 8 7 6 5 4
B White 9 8 7 6 5 4
Red 11 12 13 14 15 16
Table 3: Contents of boxes in each state and each position: Seniority
Seniority
Position (signal quality)
Realized Marbles 1 (.8) 2 (.75) 3 (7) 4 (.65) 5 (.6) 6 (.55)
state
A White 16 15 14 13 12 11
Red 4 5 6 7 8 9
B White 4 5 6 7 8 9
Red 16 15 14 13 12 11
Table 4: Treatments conducted in each sessions
(A: Anti-seniority, S:Seniority)
Sessions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Rounds 1-12 A A A A A S A S A S A
Rounds 12-16 - A S S S A S A S A S
Table 5: Mann-Whitney U tests of equal proportion of predictions which is
consistent with Bayesian posterior probability between the …rst and the last
two rounds for each session: Anti-seniority
9Anti-seniority
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6
z ¡:440 ¡:604 :000 1:319 ¡:604 1:813
P > jzj :660 :546 1:000 :187 :546 :070
Session 7 8 9 10 11
z ¡:604 1:000 ¡1:000 :000 :604
P > jzj :546 :3173 :3173 1:000 :546
Table 6: Mann-Whitney U tests of equal proportion of predictions which is
consistent with Bayesian posterior probability between the …rst and the last




P > jzj :3173 :3173
Table 7: Aggregated behavior
Anti-seniority Seniority
112 rounds, 60 rounds,
672 decisions 360 decisions
Correct predictions 467 (69.49%) 295 (81.94%)
Complete positive cascades 16 (14.29%) 36 (60.00%)
Complete negative cascades 2 (1.79%) 6 (10.00%)
Rational complete positive cascades 7 (6.25%) 36 (60.00%)
Rational complete negative cascades 1 (.89%) 6 (10.00%)
Partial cascades 29 (25.89%) 6 (10.00%)
Full revelations 65 (58.04%) 12 (20.00%)
Table 8: Mann-Whitney U tests of equal proportion for each treatment
z P > jzj
Correct predictions -4.335 .0000
Complete positive cascades -6.204 .0000
Complete negative cascades -2.431 .0151
Rational complete positive cascades -7.736 .0000
Rational complete negative cascades -2.873 .0041
Partial cascades 2.460 .0139
Full revelations 4.767 .0000
10Table 9: Tests of population proportion on the equality between
theoretical prediction and actual occurrence:
Rational complete positive cascades
Anti-seniority Seniority
z=-2.000, P < z=.0228 z=-1.878, P < z=.0302
Table 10: Tests of population proportion on the equality between
theoretical prediction and actual occurrence:
Rational complete negative cascades
Anti-seniority Seniority
z=-2.329, P < z=.0099 z=-1.921, P < z=.0274









Table 12: Percentage of deviations from Bayesian posterior by position:
Seniority
Position Overcon…dence Undercon…dence
1 - -
2 15.00% -
3 .00% .00%
4 .00% 1.67%
5 1.67% .00%
6 .00% .00%
11